

~~Memorandum~~ • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

25X1A

DATE: 16 June 1952

25X1A

TO : [REDACTED]  
FROM : Assistant Director, Scientific Intelligence  
[REDACTED]

SUBJECT: Answers to queries on the history of OSI

1. I have listed here answers to your various questions. The information necessary to give explicit answers is not yet complete. I shall continue to work on such answers as are at present vague or general.

2. ". . . how does OSI (a) get intelligence information, (b) how is this information analyzed, (c) what is the final product, and (d) who are the customers for it?"

See Appendix I. I have written a brief description of the office as it existed on 1 May 1952. In June there began a reorganization, which, however, does not alter the functions and procedures described here; it separates policy from administrative functions in the Operations Staff.

3. "There is a Sovmat Staff [REDACTED] Is this the successor of that in OSI?" (pg. 10) 25X1A

25X1A

The Sovmat Staff was never in OSI. *The concept of Sovmat was developed* On *in OSI* 25X1A

26 July 1950, [REDACTED] was appointed chief and began recruitment. The Joint Chiefs of Staff had already authorized the [REDACTED] Joint Intelligence Committee by directive 950/25 (no date yet found) to work on the problem of captured enemy material. JIC directive 456/38, approved 9 April 1951 (Armed Services Joint Intelligence Directive: Captured Enemy Material), set up JMIA. This directive was put in operation by SR 380-350-1; OPNAV INST. 1386.2 and AFON-C/DD 350.09.

*This was after  
it had been started  
in ST*

25X1A The Joint Military Intelligence Agency began to function on 8 June 1951. See [REDACTED] report for full information.

4. "It is my impression that the first AE explosion by USSR was well in advance of the time estimated that it could be produced." (pg. 31)

The Joint Nuclear Energy Intelligence Committee (JNEIC), \_/

---

\_/ The JNEIC later became the present Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee (JAEIC).

---

of which NED was chairman, estimated in 1949 that if the Soviets had the skills of American scientists and engineers they could produce a bomb in the spring of 1950. Lacking these skills, the Soviets would take until mid-1953. Since there was no evidence available to the committee at this time of penetration of the Manhattan Project or the AEC, neither of these estimates took into consideration the possibility of either penetration or outright betrayal. It seemed apparent to the committee when the first bomb explosion was detected on 26 August 1949 that there must have been betrayal. CIA informed the FBI of this opinion on 20 September 1949.

5. "If this [DCI 4/2] was approved 6 November 1950, why have certain objectives not been determined after eighteen months?" (pg. 33)

The phrase is "have not been finalized" and not "determined." Pages 34, 35, and 36 of the history provide an answer. By the Security Act of 1947, CIA has the responsibility for coordinating the intelligence activities of the Government. Agencies in the intelligence field long

before CIA was created had to agree upon objectives before they could be finalized. In nuclear energy intelligence, the NED was the organization that antedated all the rest; therefore the task of coordination was much simpler.

6. "Just what is the Department of Defense trying to do to the SIC?" (pg. 36)

The previous answer provides a clue. I would say that the difficulty lay in Pride of Previous Origin.

7. Scientific Panel in Boston -- "I understand that. . . the OSI is more skeptical." (pg. 39)

I should not say that this was true. I quote:

"A panel of eminent scientists known as the 'Boston Scientific Advisory Panel' has been established under the auspices of OO/C to consult and advise O/SI in its intelligence production activities. This panel makes available to us on a round table discussion basis some of the best scientific and technical brains in [REDACTED] and the associated industrial organizations." \_/

25X1A

---

\_/ From "Progress Report" undated, carbon copy, but covering period up to December 1951. Files of AD/SI Office.

---

The men on the panel are associated with the American defense effort. Once briefed on foreign intelligence, they can tie developments in with the developments in the United States and members of OSI in the interpretation of findings. Any advisory committee has limitations. These men are unpaid; they have fulltime jobs; they cannot know the inner workings of CIA. The amount of time they do or can contribute to CIA is very limited.

25X1A

8. "Visit of AD/SI [REDACTED] in 1950.--Plans to establish scientific representation were made in August 1949. Is 1950 <sup>no</sup> correct?" (pg. 49)

*incorrect*  
The date is correct, as far as I can gather from documents. Two different trips and two different matters are dealt with. On page 49 the author discusses the lack of organization in collection that led to the establishment of the Scientific Division [REDACTED] in 1951<sup>0</sup>; on page 50 he discusses the formation of the Scientific Intelligence team in January 1950. If in subsection 5., page 50, the first word, consequently were changed to previously the confusion would be <sup>no</sup> cleared away.

9. "Paragraph 1 'Misplaced,'" . . . . This might be rephrased."

Strike the word; it is not necessary. It refers to the extraordinary difficulty of properly labeling, classifying--bibliographically--and distributing the literature available. The library could explain the difficulty in its own terms.

*Dates:  
TDX Team Jan 50  
Sci Div established Sep 50*

25X1A